Follow-up to #6013. The signing path silently fell back to using the raw secret string as the HMAC key when a whsec_-prefixed secret had invalid base64, producing signatures no receiver could verify with no server-side signal. - Extract resolveSigningKey helper that errors on invalid whsec_ base64 - Post returns that error (logged by the async dispatcher); ValidateSigningSecret rejects it at write time so a bad secret is never stored - Fix stale comment referencing a nonexistent Authorization header - Add Go tests: key derivation, secret validation, end-to-end signature round-trip, and the invariant that the secret never leaks into API responses |
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| auth | ||
| notification | ||
| router | ||
| runner | ||
| cors.go | ||
| cors_test.go | ||
| server.go | ||